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Before a new drug can be marketed, the Food and Drug Admini-
stration must be satisfied that it is safe and effective. According to
conventional wisdom, the cost and delay involved in this process
diminish the incentives to invest in the development of new drugs.
Accordingly, several reforms aimed at restoring such incentives
have been implemented or advocated. This Article challenges the
central argument that drug regulation and drug innovation are
necessarily at odds with one another Although intuitively appeal-
ing, the argument that drug regulation negatively affects the
incentives to innovate does not fully capture the role that regula-
tion plays in this industry. This Article shows that the regulatory
framework is not solely a burden imposed on the industry; it also
provides a valuable service to the industry. Specifically, drug
regulation provides certification of drug quality. Such certifica-
tion, which may not be easily achieved by private market-based
mechanisms, prevents the market from becoming a market for
"lemons." Therefore, rather than decreasing the expected returns
to innovation, this aspect of regulation contributes to the value of
new drugs and may actually encourage innovation. This point has
largely been absent from most cost-benefit analyses of drug regu-
lation, yet without it any discussion of the merits of regulation is
incomplete.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On the evening of November 13, 1891, Mrs. Carlill saw an adver-
tisement in the Pall Mall Gazette, promising, on behalf of the Carbolic
Smoke Ball Co., a reward of £100 to "anyone who contracted influenza,
colds, or any diseases caused by taking cold," after using the ball three
times daily for two weeks and in accord with the printed directions sup-
plied with each ball.' Not knowing that her story would be familiar to
most lawyers in the common law world more than a century later,2 Mrs.
Carlill purchased a smoke ball from her local pharmacy and, despite as-
siduously using the ball for two weeks as instructed (and perhaps longer
than that), contracted influenza. She did not receive the promised reward
and legal action against the manufacturer followed. In a canonical deci-
sion the court ruled that the advertisement contained a legally binding
and enforceable promise, and that the advertisement was an offer Mrs.
Carlill accepted by performing the conditions contained therein.3 But this
1. A.W.B. Simpson, Quackery and Contract Law: The Case of the Carbolic Smoke
Ball,, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 257 (1985). All of the recited facts about the Carlill case are
based on this article.
2. See Simpson, supra note 1, at 345.
3. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1892] 1 Q.B. 256 (A.C.).
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Article is not about contract law. Rather this Article discusses the mecha-
nisms that have made medicines, such as the Carbolic Smoke Ball, a
curiosity for contemporary consumers of medicines.
As was quite evident to Mrs. Carlill in retrospect, and as may be
well known today, inhaling carbolic acid fumes cannot prevent the flu.
Not only is it ineffective, carbolic acid is a poison that the Privy Council
eventually added to the list of scheduled poisons to restrict its availabil-
ity.4 But Mrs. Carlill's incident was not singular, nor were Britain's drug
markets unique. Late nineteenth century American drug markets greatly
resembled those in Britain, where the smoke ball saga had taken place.
Most available products were totally ineffective for their stated purpose
and often worsened the conditions they purported to cure. If they existed
at all, the few manufacturers with medicines that had at least some
therapeutic benefit were lost in a sea of potentially harmful nostrums and
other quack remedies. Not only were the medicines ineffective, the lists
of maladies they purported to cure were as extensive as they were false.'
Manufacturers adapted curative claims to the perceived needs of the
market, rather than advertising the actual properties of the remedy. 6 Out-
raged by this reality, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that he "firmly
believe[d] that if the whole materia medica, as now used, could be sunk
to the bottom of the sea, it would be all the better for mankind,-and all
the worse for the fishes."
7
By the turn of the century, the industry had so increased in scope as
to precipitate a series of articles in Collier's magazine, written by
"muckraker" journalist Samuel Hopkins Adams. Adams began the series,
published in 1905-1906 with these words:
Gullible America will spend this year some seventy-five millions
of dollars in the purchase of patent medicines. In consideration
of this sum it will swallow huge quantities of alcohol, an appall-
ing amount of opiates and narcotics, a wide assortment of varied
drugs ranging from powerful and dangerous heart depressants to
insidious liver stimulants; and, far in excess of all other ingredi-
ents, undiluted fraud.8
4. Simpson, supra note 2, at 367.
5. Losing the case to Mrs. Carlill did not prevent Mr. Roe, the manufacturer of the
carbolic smoke ball, from doubling the promised reward and adding eighteen more ailments
that the ball would purportedly cure. Simpson, supra note 2, at 371.
6. See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 247-48 (1961). See also
Simpson, supra note 2, at 352.
7. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, MEDICAL ESSAYS, 202-03 (1891) (italics in original).
8. Samuel Hopkins Adams, The Great American Fraud 36 COLLIER'S 14 (Oct. 7,
1905), available at http://www.mtn.org/quack/ephemera/oct7-01 .htm.
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Adams' series of articles contributed greatly to the mounting pres-
sure, to which the medical and pharmaceutical professions gradually
joined to enact a national law regulating the food and drug industries.
Eventually this pressure led to the passage of the Pure Food and
Drugs Act of 1906.9 Congress has revised and reformed the Act several
times since its enactment a century ago. The basic structure of current
drug regulation was shaped in 1962, with the passage of the Kefauver-
Harris Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. Since 1962,
before a new drug can be marketed in the United States, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) must approve it as safe and effective.' ° This
expansion of the regulatory framework sparked considerable contro-
versy. If eliminating quack medicine from the marketplace were the only
effect of such regulation, very few would object. However, some critics
have also blamed the new regulatory framework for causing more deaths
and morbidity." The requirement to satisfy the FDA that a new drug is
safe and effective ordinarily demands a series of costly and lengthy
clinical trials. This has increased the costs of developing new drugs and
delayed their introduction into the market.
2
Furthermore, if the new drug is patented, and new drugs often are,
the time it takes to get the approval encroaches upon the period of effec-
tive patent life (EPL). This happens because patents are granted for
twenty years from the time of filing the application, 3 and filing usually
happens at a very early stage in the development process of a new drug.
On average, after getting a patent it takes an additional eight years before
the FDA approves the drug for marketing. 14 As a result, EPL is much
shorter than twenty years. 
5
9. JAMES H. YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF
1906 188-93 (1989); see also Marc T. Law, History of Food and Drug Regulation in the
United States, in EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert Whaples ed., 2004), available at http://eh.
net/encyclopedia/article/Law.Food.and.Drug.Regulation.
10. Similar regulatory requirements exist in most developed countries and elsewhere.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part IH.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2002).
14. E M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological-Progress in the Pharmaceutical-
Industry, 7 J. ECON. OF PERSP. 97, 99 (Summer 1993).
15. A common misconception is to ascribe the entire shortening of EPL to the regula-
tory process. Because a drug company would rarely have a ready-to-market product upon
being issued a patent, some delay between a patent's issuance and marketing a drug is inevita-
ble and independent of the regulatory process. Marcia Angell notes that the average time of
FDA review was sixteen months in 2002, and in some cases even less than this. See MARCIA
ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 35 (2004). In 2005, the twenty new
therapeutics approved by FDA were reviewed in an average of less than fourteen months. See
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, NEW DRUGS APPROVALS IN
2005 1 (2006), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/NDA%202005.pdf. See also U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: EFFECT OF USER FEES
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This is an unfortunate reality for drug companies, who would obvi-
ously prefer a longer EPL over a shorter one, but our concern is not with
the loss of patent-induced monopoly profits as such. As a society, we
should be concerned that the loss of such monopoly profits, assumed to
encourage innovation, would decrease the amount and speed of new
drugs available to consumers. 6 We should be worried that as a result of
the cost and delay imposed by the regulatory approval process, thou-
sands of potential new drug beneficiaries would die or unnecessarily
suffer."
Several studies of the effects of the 1962 Amendments have corrobo-
rated these concerns. They attributed an observed reduction in the
number of new drugs to the regulatory change.18 Consequently, regula-
tion of new drugs has been perceived to negatively affect the
incentivizing effect of patents, with negative consequences not only for
drug companies, but also to the public at large. To mitigate such con-
cerns, a few reforms have been adopted. Some reforms were aimed at
speeding-up the regulatory process by restructuring FDA internal proc-
esses. Others sought to provide greater funding for the process.' 9 As a
result of such reforms, the FDA "has moved from being the slowest
ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, WITHDRAWALS, AND OTHER AGENCY ACTIVITIES 3 (2002) (noting
that:
[flrom 1993 to 2001, the median approval time for new drug applications for stan-
dard drugs dropped from 27 months to 14 months. The median approval time for
new drug applications for priority drugs has remained stable at 6 months since
1997. However, the approval time for standard new molecular entities (NME),
drugs containing active ingredients that have never been marketed in the United
States in any form, has increased since 1998 from about 13 months to 20 months. In
contrast, median approval times for new biologic applications have fluctuated since
1993, ranging from a low of 12 months in 1997 to a high of about 32 months in
1995. In 2001, the median approval time for biologic applications was about 22
months.).
It does not mean, however, that the actual delay or cost caused by regulation is only sixteen or
fourteen months (on average) since in theory drug companies could be spending a lot of time
preparing for the review that they would not have spent otherwise.
16. While the actual relationship between patents and innovation is more complex than
this initial assumption of the patent system and may vary across industries, patents are consid-
ered to be highly important for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. See, e.g., Michael A.
Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 818-31 (2002).
17. SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION AND THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF OPULENCE, 2004
Distinguished Lecture AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 15-16 (Sept. 8,
2004) (summarizing the conclusions of his earlier studies).
18. See infra Part II.
19. In 1992, the U.S. Congress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No.
102-571, §§ 101-108, 106 Stat. 4491, which authorized the FDA to collect fees from drug
companies seeking to get marketing approval for new drugs. As a result, new---drug review
times decreased by as much as fifty percent. See Mary K. Olson, Pharmaceutical Policy
Change and the Safety of New Drugs, 45 J.L. & ECON. 615, 620 (2002).
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regulatory drug agency in the developed world to being the fastest."2
Other reforms sought to compensate drug companies for the shorter EPL
to restore the incentive that the patent system promised, and that regula-
tion, arguably, has not kept.
The proposed compensation can take different forms. The most
straightforward form is the extension of patent terms. In the United
States, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act)2' makes it possible for drug patentees to have
the term of their patent extended for as much as five years if they meet
certain criteria. The House Report of the Act explicitly recognized that
the enactment was motivated by drug companies' complaints that the
federal government's "regulatory review eroded the effective market
life" of patented drugs.22 In Japan, Section 67(2) of the Patent Law pro-
vides that "the term of the patent right may be extended ... by a period
not exceeding five years if, because of the necessity of obtaining an ap-
proval ... there was a period in which it was not possible to work the
patented invention."23 In the European Union, Council Regulation
1768/92 created a new instrument, Supplementary Protection Certificate
(SPC), which extends market exclusivity for patented drugs by denying
marketing approval to generic competitors for a period of up to five
years after the expiry of the patent.24 While de jure an SPC is not a pat-
ent, for practical purposes the instruments are equivalent .2 The preamble
to Regulation 1768/92 provides the following rationale:
Whereas pharmaceutical research plays a decisive role in the
continuing improvement in public health;
Whereas medicinal products, especially those that are the result
of long, costly research will not continue to be developed in the
Community and in Europe unless they are covered by favourable
rules that provide sufficient protection to encourage such re-
search;
Whereas at the moment the period that elapses between the fil-
ing of an application for a patent for a new medicinal product
and authorization to place the medicinal product on the market
20. ANGELL, supra note 15, at 35.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2007).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2687.
23. Patent Law, Japan Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 67(2) (amended by Law No. 220
(1999)), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/en/jp/jp036en.pdf.
24. Council Regulation 1768/92, 1992 O.J. (L 182) 1 (EC).
25. See Edward H. Mazer, Supplementary Protection Certificates in the European Eco-
nomic Community, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 571 (1993).
(Vol. 14:1
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makes the period of effective protection under the patent insuffi-
cient to cover the investment put into the research;
Whereas this situation leads to a lack of protection which penal-
izes pharmaceutical research;1
6
This Article questions this justification for patent term extension,
and challenges the argument that drug regulation and drug innovation are
at odds. Although intuitively appealing, the argument that new drug
regulation negatively affects the incentives for new drug innovation does
not fully capture the role that regulation plays in the industry. I will show
that the regulatory framework is not solely a burden imposed on the in-
dustry, but also a valuable service of drug quality certification. I will
suggest that rather than decreasing the expected returns to innovation,
this aspect of the regulation, which may not be easily substituted by pri-
vate market-based mechanisms, contributes to the value of new drugs
and therefore may actually encourage innovation. Consequently, the ef-
fect of drug regulation may be a complement, rather than antithetical to
the patent system.
This Article has a modest purpose. Rather than aiming to defend the
current method of drug regulation and every particular aspect of it, or
advocate its inherent superiority over other forms of quality assurance, I
simply aim to highlight another aspect of drug regulation which so far
has been insufficiently studied. This aspect may be nonetheless too im-
portant to omit from the cost-benefit analysis of drug regulation or
proposals for its reform. As such, this Article's contribution lies mainly
in setting an agenda for future research, not in concrete conclusions or
suggestions for reform.
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DRUG REGULATION AND PATENTS
The standard justification for drug regulation is a perceived market
failure. It is assumed that in unregulated markets, supplying firms would
perform insufficient pre-market testing to avoid the high costs of testing
or to gain advantage in the market as first movers. Some fear such firms
would overstate positive features and understate negative ones in pro-
moting and labeling their products.27 This market failure results from
information imperfection: customers' inability to obtain full information
26. Council Regulation 1768/92, 1992 O.J. (L 182) 1 (EC).
27. HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTI-
CALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 7 (1983); see also Patricia M. Danzon, The
Pharmaceutical Industry, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1055, 1058 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds. 2000) available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/
5880book.pdf.
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about the benefits and risks of new drugs." This in turn leads firms to
take advantage of the imperfection, and supply less accurate information
about their products, and cause consumers to waste money on drugs that
may be harmful or simply unnecessary. While such imperfections char-
acterize many consumer products, the potentially severe and irreversible
threats to human health from drug consumption justify extensive gov-
ernment intervention 9 beyond the general domains of tort law or
consumer protection law.30 Seen in this light, drug regulation is essen-
tially paternalistic because it seeks to protect the misinformed consumer
from better-informed sellers.
Drug regulation critics would not generally dispute that such market
failure may exist, but would point out the unfortunate existence of a con-
current regulatory failure. Such critics argue that the regulatory costs of
increased mortality and prolonged morbidity that result from reduced
innovation and delay are greater than the social cost of market failure.3'
Following an influential study by Sam Peltzman in 1973, many econo-
mists' views on drug regulation, and specifically the 1962 Amendments,
have been overwhelmingly negative. Peltzman, who studied the effects
of the 1962 Amendments, after observing a sharp post-Amendments de-
cline in the introduction of new drugs (or new chemical entities (NCEs)),
attributed this decline to the Amendments' stringent conditions for mar-
keting new drugs.32 He concluded that the benefit of saving consumers
money on ineffective drugs was far outweighed by the various costs cre-
ated by reduced innovation.33 In 1974, Peltzman published a larger study,
which expanded his analysis to include a measurement of the health-
related effects of delays in innovation attributed to the Amendments. 34 He
calculated extremely high costs of delay35 based on measurable effects
on productivity as a result of morbidity, mortality, or costs of treatment
attributable to the delay.
3 6
28. GRABOWSKI & VERNON, supra note 27, at 7.
29. Id.
30. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357, 370 (1984).
31. GRABOWSKI & VERNON, supra note 27; Sam Peltzman, Evaluation of Consumer
Protection Legislation-1962 Drug Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049, 1090 (1973).
32. Peltzman, supra note 31, at 1073-76.
33. Id. at 1089.
34. SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962
AMENDMENTS (1974).
35. Id. at 58-69 (estimating the two year cost-of-delay to be $2 billion for tuberculosis
therapy, $1.4 billion for tranquilizers, and $150 million for polio vaccinations, and estimating
the two year cost-of-delay at several billion dollars and upwards of 100,000 lives for heart
disease and cancer treatments).
36. Id.
[Vol. 14:1
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While other economists criticized Peltzman's studies on several
grounds, 37 and the decline in new drug introduction has changed its
course during the 1980s and the 1990s,38 the perception that drug regula-
tion, and especially the 1962 Amendments, have negatively affected
pharmaceutical innovation has prevailed.39
Pursuant to this perception of drug regulation, the respective roles of
patent laws and drug regulation laws are seen as an exercise in balancing
two opposing interests: those of industry (through patents), and those of
consumers (through drug regulation). Patent laws, by providing market
exclusivity, generate the financial incentives to innovate. In contrast,
drug regulation laws keep unsafe and ineffective drugs off the market to
protect consumers, but diminish incentives to innovate.
However, the relationship between patents and drug regulation is
more complicated. As Rebecca Eisenberg has already noted, "Although
patents often take most of the credit for the profits of drug development,
while drug regulation takes much of the blame for its costs, upon closer
inspection these two legal regimes operate in tandem to limit competi-
tion in lucrative markets for drugs."' She argues that by forcing drug
37. See, e.g., PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 147 (1980) (maintaining that Peltzman overestimated the effect of the
Amendments, and noting that "the amendments took effect gradually over the years and did
not cause the drop in new drug introductions in the early 1960s"). But see Steven N. Wiggins,
Product Quality Regulation and New Drug Introductions: Some Evidence from the 1970s, 63
REV. EcON. & STAT. 615 (1981) (concluding that regulation indeed led to a decline in the
introduction of new drugs).
38. During the 1980s, the number of approvals per year increased 35% to 18.5. In the
1990s, the approvals grew an additional 48% to 27.4. See Joseph A. Dimasi, New Drug Inno-
vation and Pharmaceutical Industry Structure: Trends in the Output of Pharmaceutical Firms,
34 DRUG INFO. J. 1169, 1172 (2000). This turnaround has been explained by adaptation of
drug companies to the new regulatory regime, as well as new discovery opportunities that
resulted from breakthroughs in biochemistry, enzymology, molecular biology, id at 1172, and
genetic engineering, Scherer, supra note 14, at 100. More recently there has again been a
downturn. F. M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry-Prices and Progress, 351 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 927, 927 (2004).
39. One study considered five hypotheses that were advanced for explaining the decline
in NCEs in the post-Amendment period: (1) tighter regulation of the industry by the FDA
following the Amendments, as suggested by Peltzman; (2) that the decline is in fact illusory;
that the number of "important" new drugs introduced annually (as opposed to total number)
has not declined; (3) that the decline was a natural consequence of the rapid rate of new drug
development in the 1950s, which led to "depletion of research opportunities" in subsequent
years; (4) that the tragic thalidomide episode in the early 1960s increased drug firms' and
physicians' caution in their decisions concerning the marketing and prescribing of new drugs;
and (5) that the costs of developing new drugs increased as a result of advances in pharmacol-
ogical science. See Henry G. Grabowski et al., Estimating Effects of Regulation on
Innovation-International Comparative Analysis of Pharmaceutical Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON.
133 (1978). They concluded that that the first cause, the enactment of the 1962 Amendments,
was the primary (although not exclusive) reason for the decline in NCEs. Id. at 159.
40. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regu-
lation, 20 HEALTH AFF. 119, 132 (2001).
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companies to conduct clinical trials and submit their results to independ-
ent expert scrutiny, "the FDA plays an important structural role in
promoting a valuable form of biomedical R&D that private firms are
undermotivated to perform on their own."4' Moreover, she shows how
drug regulation laws often support the profitability of new drugs. In
some cases, drug laws provide market exclusivity directly, irrespective of
patent protection. For example, the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 directs the
FDA to provide seven years of market exclusivity for new drugs devel-
oped for treating rare diseases and conditions that affect fewer than
200,000 patients in the US.4 2 Developers of pioneering NCEs not previ-
ously approved may get five years of exclusivity, and the introduction of
changes in approved products may qualify for three years of exclusiv-
ity.43 Drug regulation also benefits incumbent drug companies by
creating indirect barriers for the entry of competitors. Post patent expiry,
and despite lower regulatory burdens, regulatory requirements create a
significant entry barrier for generic drugs," and may effectively prevent
parallel imports or re-imports of approved drugs even if patent law failed
to do the same . 4 But even Eisenberg, in her more nuanced account of
how patent laws and drug laws intertwine, sees the mere requirement to
prove safety and efficacy as a regulatory burden: one that justifies com-
pensating measures in the form of market exclusivity beyond that
granted by patent law.
46
Yet, the intuitively appealing argument that regulatory approval re-
duces the expected returns from drug innovation, and therefore justifies
the extension of patent terms, is potentially flawed. The question is not
whether or not regulation eats into effective patent life because undoubt-
edly it does this. The question is whether regulatory review of new drugs
erodes drug companies' profits and thereby reduces the incentive to in-
vest in innovative drugs. This is a question about cause and effect and
the opportunity cost of regulation. To assess regulatory review's effect on
drug companies, one should ask, with any given patent term, under
which conditions drug companies will do better: with or without regula-
tory review. Only if the combination of regulatory review and patents
reduces drug companies' expected profits compared to patents without
such review will regulation correctly be seen as a burden. If the combi-
nation of patent and regulation yields greater profits, then regulation,
41. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELE-
COMM. & TECH. L. REv. 345, 370 (2007).
42. Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 123; Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 359.
43. Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 123; Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 359-60.
44. Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 121; Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 356-57.
45. Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 13 1.
46. Id. at 123.
[Vol. 14:1
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although coupled with reduced EPL, benefits drug companies, and by
implication, benefits innovation.4 ' To illustrate, higher education un-
doubtedly reduces one's effective "job-market life." Yet this tells us
nothing about the expected income one earns after graduation. If higher
education improves one's skills, the delay in entry into the job market
increases one's expected income. Moreover, even if higher education
does not improve one's productivity but merely serves as a screening
device, allowing employers to distinguish between potential employees
of differing abilities, pursuing higher education may be worthwhile for
such individuals who thereby signal their quality.4" Similarly, if regula-
tory review of new drugs increases their value and marketability, a
certain amount of regulation increases the expected profits from patented
drugs and the incentive to innovate.
But why would regulation increase the expected profit from patented
drugs? New drugs are "credence goods" because consumers are never
sure about their quality or whether they actually need them.49 Severe
asymmetry of information exists between drug companies and consum-
ers regarding drugs' safety and efficacy ("quality"). 0 Consequently, in
the absence of mechanisms to signal and commit to the quality of drugs,
the market for drugs may become a "market for lemons": a smaller mar-
ket in which only low quality drugs are sold, by non-trustworthy sellers;
a market in which Carbolic Smoke Balls and other snake oils are the
common cures for diseases. With a few recent exceptions,5' most schol-
arship has overlooked this aspect of drug regulation. 2
If the assumption that without regulation or other forms of quality
assurance the market will become a market for lemons is true, then
rather than a burden, regulatory review of new drugs may actually be an
effective mechanism for assuring the quality of drugs, one that drug
47. The debate assumes that shorter EPL and the costs of compliance with regulation
reduce drug companies' profits, and thus reduce the expected return on innovation. It should
be noted though that expected profits are just one of the factors that influence innovation.
48. Kenneth J. Arrow, Higher Education as a Filter, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 193, 194 (1973).
See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973).
49. As will be explained below, not only patients are uncertain about the quality of
drugs but also physicians who decide which drugs to prescribe.
50. The choice of one term such as "quality" to describe both safety and efficacy is
more than mere convenience, as the two are interdependent. Anita Bernstein and Joseph Bern-
stein explain that because all drugs are poisons and can do harm, the term "safe" should be
understood in the context of a drug's potential benefits. Consumers may be interested, and
regulators may "tolerate grim side effects in a lifesaving drug that would be fatal to the ap-
proval of a drug with superficial and cosmetic effects, or for yet another beta blocker." See
Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription for Drug Regulation, 54
BUFF. L. REv. 569, 573 (2006).
51. See Daniel Carpenter, A Proposal for Financing Postmarketing Drug Safety Studies
by Augmenting FDA User Fees, 24 HEALTH AFF. W5-469 (2005); Law, supra note 9.
52. See id.
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companies would have had to establish themselves in order to avoid the
"lemons" problem (e.g. by establishing their own certifying body).53 Fur-
thermore, as will be explained in more detail below, it is possible that the
government is even more suitable to perform this function because it is a
disinterested third party. Government can effectively enforce compliance
with the approval process and impose sanctions for attempts and per-
ceived attempts to cheat the process. Rather than a drag on innovation,
regulatory approval of new drugs may actually perform a valuable ser-
vice that increases the expected returns from innovation. Drug regulation
provides the quality assurance necessary to persuade consumers to pur-
chase drugs, and patents provide the mechanism for recouping the
investment necessary for developing both the drugs and information re-
garding their quality.
4
Moreover, even if drug regulation increases the cost of innovation, it
increases the cost of all new drugs so it "simultaneously discourages
creative destruction through between-patent competition ... [thus pro-
viding] an improved patent by keeping out low-quality innovators that
could have competed with high-quality innovators. 55 However, the cost
of regulation is not equal for all drugs. Testing and approving a new drug
whose safety and efficacy are apparent will be less costly than testing
and approving a new drug that is less effective and causes more side ef-
fects and complications. Therefore, drug regulation's discouraging effect
affects low quality drugs more than it affects high quality drugs, which
then face less intense competition in the market place.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
IN PHARMACEUTICALS
A. Information Asymmetry and Market Failures
Economic theory distinguishes between three types of goods, ac-
cording to the nature and timing of information that consumers can
53. Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 50, at 572 (highlighting a distinction between
drug regulation in which the industry pursues the same thing that the regulator demands, as
both the regulators and the regulated seek safe and effective drugs, and other instances of
regulation (such as pollution prevention, securities regulation or workplace safety) where
regulation "points at the dark underbelly of a business").
54. Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 370. Eisenberg argues that the weaker regulation of
vitamins and dietary supplements makes sense because in the absence of patents on such
products, manufacturers will not be able to capture the value of clinical trials. Therefore, the
likely result of applying the same regulatory standard to pharmaceuticals will not be improved
quality but disappearance of these products from the market. Id. at 379-80.
55. Frank R. Lichtenberg & Tomas J. Philipson, The Dual Effects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Regulations: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceuticals
Industry, 45 J.L. & EcON. 643, 651 (2002).
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obtain about their quality. The quality of "search goods" can be ascer-
tained before purchase, whereas for "experience goods," quality can only
be learned through use. 6 The quality of the third category, "credence
goods," cannot be evaluated through normal means. Assessing credence
goods' value requires additional costly information. Repair of durable
machines or human beings are the classic examples because most con-
sumers are highly unfamiliar with their intricacies and peculiarities .
The line between experience goods and credence goods may not al-
ways be sharp, especially if quality will eventually be discerned through
use after the lapse of considerable time. Furthermore, most goods pos-
sess many attributes: some are learned before purchase, some after
purchase, and some are never learned. 9 For example, a potential buyer of
canned tuna can know before purchase that she buys a canned product,
and can know after purchase that the content of the can indeed looks and
tastes like tuna. However, she may find it more costly to verify that it is
indeed tuna (and not some imitation). She will find it prohibitively costly
to verify whether eating this particular tuna is safe (e.g., not contami-
nated), or verify other attributes that some consumers may deem
important such as whether the product contains genetically modified or-
ganisms, whether it was derived from organic farming, the age and
working conditions of the labor force, the environmental impact of the
production process, compliance with animal welfare standards, nutri-
tional properties, or the geographical origin of the product.
60
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, the classifications of search, experi-
ence, and credence are useful for our analysis.
Most drugs can be easily characterized as credence goods, particu-
larly with regard to their most important attributes: efficacy and safety.
For some common symptoms a consumer may easily assess how effec-
tive a drug is, especially with frequent use. Thus, setting aside placebo
effects, most consumers who suffer from headaches could immediately
assess the efficacy of a pain killer. Similarly, most men suffering from
erectile dysfunction could easily determine the effectiveness of a drug like
Viagra. However, for many drugs whose expected effect is not immediate
or immediately observable, or which must be combined with other drugs
56. Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. EcON. 311, 311-12
(1970) (suggesting the style of a dress as an example for a search good and the taste of a par-
ticular brand of canned tuna as an example of an experience good).
57. Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & EcON. 67, 69 (1973).
58. Id. at 69 n.5.
59. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 106 (1988).
60. Giovanni Anania & Rosanna Nistico, Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in
Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute Cannot Be Fully Trusted?, 160 J. INSTITU-
TIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 681, 682 (2004).
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or treatments, assessing how effective a drug is can be extremely difficult.
First, as Peter Temin points out, the concept of effectiveness is itself
vague, as it relates not only to the drug's ability to correct some undesir-
able condition but it can relate to other characteristics such as the
method of administration (oral, injectible, or topical) and the dosage re-
quired. 6' Even more difficult for most consumers is knowing and
evaluating the expected long-term effects of the drug, the possible com-
62plications, or the reactions with other substances. Moreover, even if
they were affluent enough to do so, because combining different drugs
may be ineffective, or even lethal, consumers cannot simply try every
drug and every cure until they find the one that works. They need to
know before they commit to a specific drug that it is likely to work.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, however dramatic the effect
of a drug on one person may be, since the effect of drugs may vary from
person to person, meaningful information on drugs' quality can be ob-
tained only by looking at large samples and carefully applying statistical
methods.63 Not only is this type of epidemiological research beyond the
reach of consumers, it is also beyond the reach of most practicing physi-
cians.64
Therefore, if sellers (drug companies) have better information about
the efficacy and safety of their products, severe asymmetry of informa-
tion about the quality of drugs (their efficacy and safety) may occur.65
And when the information held by sellers and buyers is asymmetric the
market may fail, as George Akerlof showed in his famous "lemons mar-
ket" paper.6 6
61. TEMIN, supra note 37, at 9.
62. Id. at 9-10.
63. Id. at 10; see also Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 50, at 578-81.
64. TEMIN, supra note 37, at 10. See also JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE
BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 275 (2004).
65. The fact that statistically significant information about the quality of drugs can be
obtained only by looking at large numbers may suggest that, at least in the case of new drugs,
there is no information asymmetry but rather symmetry of misinformation. However, assum-
ing that drug companies will always conduct some pre-marketing testing, the assumption of
information asymmetry seems correct. At any point in time, the drug company will have better
information than that available to the individual consumer.
66. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons "-Quality Uncertainty and Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). Note that uncertainty about the quality of a good is
distinguished from information asymmetry. If both sellers and buyers face the same uncer-
tainty about the value of the good, there is no asymmetry. In Akerlof's example of cars, there
is no asymmetry of information about whether a specific new car is good or is a lemon. In the
case of used cars, however, asymmetry of information develops because the owner of a spe-
cific car has used it for a while and formed a good idea about its quality. While it could be
argued that producers of new drugs that have not been subjected to extensive testing lack in-
formation as to their quality, just as consumers do, this argument would be false. Even in the
extreme case in which the producer had not performed any testing of the drug, the very fact
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Akerlof describes how the interaction between quality heterogeneity
and asymmetrical information about the quality of products may lead to
the disappearance of a market, despite the fact that sellers of high-quality
products are willing to sell at prices below which buyers are willing to
buy.67 In Akerlof's model, the buyer's inability to ascertain the quality of
a good creates asymmetry of information, which creates an incentive for
low-quality sellers to pass off their goods as higher-quality.6 The buyer,
however, takes this incentive into consideration, and discounts all sellers'
quality claims, so that for any given price only the average quality will
be considered. 69 As a result, sellers who offer higher-than-average quality
will be driven out of the market.7° Unless credible guarantees of the qual-
ity of the good exist, this mechanism, in which the low-quality products
drive out the high-quality, repeats itself until a no-trade equilibrium is
reached.7'
Akerlof presented his model using the market for used cars and men-
tioned a few other examples, such as the unavailability of privately
supplied health insurance for the elderly,72 employers' reluctance to hire
members of minority groups,73 or the dearth of formal credit markets in
underdeveloped countries.74 Nineteenth century drug markets, and per-
haps contemporary dietary supplement markets, could easily supplement
this list. In Akerlof's stylized model the market disappears, yet in real
life markets rarely disappear altogether. They may only shrink as the
frequency of transactions decrease in comparison to what would occur if
the available information were perfect, or if "anti-lemon devices,"
mechanisms to credibly assure the quality of products, were available."
Akerlof's theory and its prediction that the market disappears is not in-
consistent with the fact that a seemingly lively market for quack
medicines existed in the nineteenth century. If the costs of producing and
selling quack medicines are sufficiently low, and given that such medi-
cines do not require heavy investment in research and development this
seems like a fair assumption, even modest sales at low prices would make
such a market sustainable. This can happen as long as there are enough
consumers who, either out of mere ignorance or rational ignorance, are
that the drug had not been tested is a very valuable piece of information that the producer
would possess and the consumer would not.
67. Id. at 490-91.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 490.
71. Id. at 490-91.
72. Akerlof, supra note 66, at 492-94.
73. Id. at 494-95.
74. Id. at 497-99.
75. TIROLE, supra note 59, at 109.
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willing to purchase such medicines. 6 Therefore, it is not the market for
quack medicines that disappears under Akerlof's theory, but rather the
market for quality medicines which disappears, or more precisely, fails
to emerge. Therefore, while a small subset of consumers may deserve
paternalistic regulation to protect them from their own ignorance, the
more important effect of such regulation is actually on those consumers
and sellers who would not otherwise be in the market.77
The Akerlovian failure which I present here differs markedly from
the informational failure commonly perceived as the basis for drug regu-
lation. 8 While both failures result from information imperfections in the
marketplace, in the "traditional" failure, self-interested sellers refrain
from acquiring and providing information to consumers, knowing that
market imperfections would allow them to profit from such tactics with-
out immediately losing patronage to competitors. This results in "wasted
expenditures on ineffective drugs,"7 9 and possibly in strategic use of
meaningless product innovation or differentiation as an obstacle to price
competition." Government intervention that is designed to increase the
information available to consumers operates against sellers' self interest.
As much as consumers would cherish it, producers would loath it. In
contrast, in the Akelovian scenario, honest sellers of high quality cre-
dence goods are interested in providing enough accurate information to
consumers, yet they cannot credibly do so. Given consumers' inability to
distinguish between honest sellers and dishonest ones, sellers face the
problem of persuading consumers that the information provided by them
is indeed sufficient and accurate. Rather than causing consumers to
wastefully expend money on ineffective drugs, this failure to signal qual-
ity results in under-expenditure on drugs, which in turn, may lead to
under-investment. In the Akerlovian scenario, honest sellers and con-
sumers alike would welcome measures that would allow them to
credibly signal their quality. Such measures may include regulatory ones.
76. Merely ignorant consumers would purchase such drugs believing they would work.
Rationally ignorant consumers may suspect that such drugs would not work, but might be
willing to take a chance if the price were sufficiently low.
77. Note that under perfectly Akerlovian conditions, see Akerlof, supra note 66, a pa-
ternalistic regulation is not required, because no consumer suffers harm by buying quack
medicine. Consumers either fail to buy or buy a lemon at a discounted price which reflects the
probability of low quality. As noted, though, in real life some consumers may nevertheless be
harmed.
78. See GRABOWSKI & VERNON, supra note 27; Danzon, supra note 27.
79. Danzon, supra note 27, at 1058.
80. Id. at 1069.
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B. The Implications for Pharmaceuticals
The implications for pharmaceuticals are clear. Without mechanisms
capable of credibly assuring the quality of drugs, drug markets would
perform sub-optimally. They may turn into lemons markets. Anti-lemon
devices thus enable both drug consumers and drug producers to increase
the available gains from trade. Consumers' trust in the safety and effi-
cacy of drugs means more money for drug companies. It increases the
value consumers ascribe to new drugs and translates into an increase in
the expected returns for investment in new drugs. Now, if regulatory re-
view of new drugs provides such assurances, it may actually supplement
patents in creating incentives to innovate, not detract from such incen-
tives. The justification for patent term extension is thus turned on its
head. Instead of decreasing the expected profits secured by drug patents,
regulatory review boosts them. Instead of diminishing the incentives to
innovate, regulatory review strengthens them. Instead of a burden, one
can reconceptualize regulatory review of new drugs as a valuable pro-
innovation service the government provides.
In fact, reconceptualizing drug regulation as a service rendered to
the drug industry may even justify shortening patent terms for new
drugs. A potential argument could be that if the government provides this
service through tax revenues,8' the public may justifiably insist on de-
manding earlier competitive supply of new drugs. The quid pro quo
argument ("you penalize us by demanding prior approval of new drugs
and therefore should compensate us") can be used to promote just the
opposite result ("we subsidize you by assuring the quality of your prod-
ucts and therefore we should get in return lower drug prices earlier").82
Yet any such polarized views about the relationship between patents,
drug regulation, and innovation would be misleading. Before reaching
any conclusion about the implications of this insight on public policy,
the following should be considered. First, even if regulatory review of
drugs benefits the industry in general, it can only be true up to a certain
limit. Clearly, if it took nineteen years to approve a new drug it is less
likely that one remaining year of EPL would yield enough profit to make
the investment worthwhile. Therefore, regulatory review benefits the
industry only if an FDA approved drug, sold under patent for a shorter
81. Although since 1992, with the enactment of PDUFA, drug companies now shoulder
part of the financial burden of funding the FDA, such user fees from drug companies only
supplement but do not substitute the FDA's annual appropriation for salaries and expenses.
See US GAO, supra note 15, at 1.
82. Possibly, if forced to choose between regulation with shorter EPL and non-
regulation with longer EPL, drug companies may prefer the former option. But because they
are not faced with the need to choose, they may assert the first quid pro quo and enjoy the best
of both worlds: the benefits of regulation and longer EPL.
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period, generates higher profits than a non-approved drug sold under
patent for the full patent term. Second, since we do not know what the
optimal patent term is, it is still plausible that patents should be extended
despite the positive effects of regulation. Third, recognizing the benefits
arising from regulatory approval does not imply that the current regulatory
framework is optimal and cannot be improved 3 Such improvements, by
reducing the development time of new drugs or otherwise decreasing de-
velopment costs, may increase the overall incentive from the combination
of patents and regulatory review, and bring new (and presumably better)
drugs to the market earlier rather than later. Therefore nothing in this Ar-
ticle should be read as discouraging attempts to improve the current
system. Lastly, ultimately determining whether regulation is a burden or
a benefit requires considering how effective alternative measures for
quality assurance can be. In particular, it requires determining whether
public regulation inhibits, substitutes, or complements effective market-
based, anti-lemon devices.
Nonetheless, the true opportunity cost of regulation is not simply the
forgone profits of a shorter EPL, but should also take into account the
possibility that in the absence of regulation and the quality signal that it
conveys, drug companies would either have to invest in alternative sig-
naling methods and incur the cost and delay associated with these,84 enter
the market earlier but gain less profit, or refrain from entering altogether.
Therefore, even if regulation is less efficient compared to self-regulation
or other alternative signaling methods, the actual cost of regulation is
only the difference between its cost and the cost of its alternatives. The
current literature's failure to acknowledge this pro-industry role of regu-
lation thus tends to overstate its negative impact.
The following section discusses what market-based anti-lemon de-
vices might be used and their applicability to new drugs.
83. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt, Adrian H. B. Gottschalk, & Matthew W. Stobeck, Oppor-
tunities for Improving the Drug Development Process: Results from a Survey of Industry and
the FDA, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. WI 1425, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=745818.
84. In some cases, drug companies found it advantageous from a marketing perspective
to conduct more Phase III (pre-approval) and Phase IV (post-approval) tests than the FDA
required, hoping to improve their competitive position vis-A-vis competing drugs. See F. M.
Scherer, "Pharmaceutical Innovation" 20 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working Paper No.
RWP07-004, 2007) available at http://ssm.comlabstract=902395. Scherer also notes that in
pharmaceuticals, "substantial risks of total failure persist later in the research and development
cycle than in most other industries," whereby about one-third of the molecules brought into
Phase III tests failed getting FDA approval. Id. at 4. This suggests that drug companies would
not be able to credibly commit to quality without conducting clinical trials on their own initia-
tive. Following a successful completion of Phase III tests, it takes on average an additional one
to two years until regulatory approval is obtained. Id. at 5.
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IV. ANTI-LEMON DEVICES
Lemonization of markets, of course, is not an inevitable conse-
quence of information asymmetry. Akerlof himself acknowledged that
"numerous institutions arise to counteract the effects of quality uncer-
tainty," s and that in some cases, government intervention may increase
sellers' and buyers' welfare. This Article focuses on government inter-
vention through mandatory regulatory review and its potential anti-
lemonizing effects. However, it may be useful to discuss market-based
institutions and their potential limitations.
A. Repeat Purchases
Repeat purchases may sometimes counteract information failures.
As consumers' positive or negative experiences from consuming a prod-
uct would affect their decision whether to keep buying the product,
producers interested in repeat sales would supply quality to induce a
positive experience. This is one significant difference between drugs and
used cars: a seller of a used car may not expect repeat purchases,
whereas a drug manufacturer may. Yet this difference should not be
overstated. The efficacy of the mechanism requires two necessary condi-
tions: 1) consumers must learn the quality of the purchased item
sufficiently quickly, and 2) they must renew their purchases sufficiently
often8 6 As noted earlier, such conditions likely apply to the efficacy at-
tributes of a few drugs, such as pain killers or Viagra, whereby the
consumer can easily identify the symptom and verify the result. In such
cases, with repeat use and frequent correlation between drug use and
symptom relief, the patient may reasonably infer causation. This may
explain why, prior to the therapeutic revolution that began in the late
1930s (which coincided with heightened regulation of drugs), most
available effective drugs were limited in their function to the immediate
relief of common symptoms, not to curing the underlying condition.87 Yet
for many drugs, and especially those treating more serious and less
common conditions, repeat purchases may not be frequent enough and
ascertaining efficacy requires expertise that consumers do not usually
possess. Furthermore, even when repeated use allows consumers to as-
certain drugs' immediate effect and benefit, they are incapable of
evaluating their long run safety and potential complications. Therefore,
for many drugs, repeat purchases are unlikely to function well as anti-
lemon devices.
85. Akerlof, supra note 66, at 499.
86. TIROLE, supra note 59, at 112.
87. TEMIN, supra note 37, at 36.
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B. Warranties
Sellers may use warranties to signal quality. By committing them-
selves to some self-imposed penalty enforceable by consumers if they
fail to stand for the claimed quality of a product, sellers signal that the
product's quality is indeed high." Yet the signaling effect of warranties
may work better in the case of experience goods than in the case of cre-
dence goods. Warranties' effectiveness depends on their enforceability,
which, in turn, depends on the ability to verify quality. This is why the
Carbolic Smoke Ball Company 9 could easily have promised to pay £100
for anyone who contracted influenza after using the carbolic smoke ball
even though the ball would not prevent or cure the flu. Failing to antici-
pate that its own actions would change the law, it assumed that under
then-existing contract law such a promise would not be enforceable,
even if the fallacy of its promise was easily observable ex post. Follow-
ing the legal change, the company no longer offered the same reward.90
But even if such promises can be enforced as a matter of contract law
doctrine, the inherent difficulty in assessing most drugs' quality in any
particular case would make it extremely difficult for a court to verify
whether the drug failed to stand for its claimed quality.9'
C. Branding and Advertising
Branding and advertising may signal quality in a number of ways
and function as anti-lemon devices. First, drug companies may use ad-
vertisements to supply information about the quality of their drugs.92 The
problem, of course, is that consumers would not necessarily believe them
and may discount the claims altogether. However, the quality signal may
not lie in the content of advertising, but rather in the information con-
veyed by the fact of expenditure on advertising and brand building, even
88. Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure
about Product Quality, 24 J. LAW ECON. 461, 470-77 (1981). Akerlof makes a brief early
statement of signal theory, which explains warranties as information provided to consumers by
manufacturers to inform them of the reliability of a product. See Akerlof, supra note 66, at
499; Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 117, 128 (2001)
(similarly applying warranties and voluntary labeling to food products).
89. See, e.g., Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1892] 1 Q.B. 256 (A.C.).
90. See Simpson, supra note 2, at 371. For a brief period after losing the case, the Car-
bolic Smoke Ball Co. continued to offer a reward, but only a single one, and subject to
"conditions to be obtained on application, a duplicate of which must be signed and deposited
with the Company in London by the applicant before commencing the treatment .... Id. The
offer itself remained open for a limited period. Id. In later advertisements, the company did
not cease to make remarkable claims about the curative qualities of the Smoke Ball, but it
stopped offering the reward. Id.
91. See supra Part III.B.
92. I ignore current regulatory restrictions on drug advertisements.
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if such advertising contains no substantive information. Such apparently
wasteful expenditures signal quality because they are sunk costs that
would not make economic sense unless the firm plans to stay long
enough in the market to recover them. Since high quality products are
likely to have longer life than low quality ones, large advertising and
brand building expenditures signal their quality.93
In addition, in those cases in which the advertisement does make
claims about the quality of the product and those claims later turn out to
be false, the firm risks reputational damage and future liability under
false advertising or product liability laws. Therefore, advertising claims
about product quality is a risky venture, which a rational firm might not
take unless it genuinely believed that the product is as good as adver-
tised.
But these considerations also demonstrate the limits of advertising as
a quality signal for credence goods such as drugs. In order to function,
the low quality of advertised low quality products should be promptly
discovered. Although it is not unreasonable to expect that such informa-
tion would eventually surface, in the interim, a sufficient number of
consumers may insufficiently discount the quality claim and purchase
the product to allow recovery of the sunk cost of deceptive advertising.
Therefore, in order for ex post discovery of deceptive advertising to pro-
vide an ex ante incentive to supply quality, low quality should be able to
surface early enough. However, in the case of drugs, this may not hap-
pen.94 In addition, if the injury caused by the low quality drug is very
large, the seller may not have the resources to pay a very large damages
judgment,95 and may not face adequate incentives to advertise accurate
information. If the injury is too small (e.g., a drug relatively is safe but
ineffective), individual victims may not find it worthwhile to sue,96 and
even a class action may not be highly attractive if the damages collecti-
ble were small.
Because of such imperfections, some dishonest sellers may find it
worthwhile to invest in advertising and branding and free-ride on the
reputation of honest sellers. Consumers may respond by discounting the
authenticity of all sellers' quality signal.97 If the number of dishonest
93. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. EcON. 615, 630-33 (1981).
94. The long period that it takes to conduct clinical trials and get FDA approval may
indicate that the therapeutic effect of drugs and their safety are not immediately evident.
95. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 383-84 (6th ed. 2003).
96. Id.
97. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC 526 U.S. 756 (1999). In this case, the U.S. Supreme
Court, relying on a "lemons" theory, refused to condemn as facially anti-competitive a profes-
sional association's rules limiting its members' advertising. The Court noted that "in a market for
professional services, in which advertising is relatively rare and the comparability of service
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sellers is large enough, and the discount serious enough, lemonization
may ensue. Therefore, these devices' effectiveness in preventing lemoni-
zation depends on honest sellers' ability to distinguish themselves from
dishonest ones, perhaps by investing even more heavily in advertising
and branding. Even if this may ultimately weed out dishonest sellers,
this may not come without cost. Such sunk costs may increase the entry
barriers into the relevant markets, and the reduced competition may
cause social losses from an increase in prices or decrease in innovation
(although under some conditions such decrease in competition may
augment patents leading to increase in innovation).98
Drug companies' behavior is consistent with the above, at least
where direct-to-consumer advertising is allowed.99 Drug companies
spend heavily on advertising and branding. Historically, this practice
began with the discovery of antibiotics, which led to the therapeutic
revolution and the emergence of research-based drug companies, as op-
posed to earlier symptomatic drug companies.' °° Since information
asymmetry is greater in the case of therapeutic drugs, the growth and
importance of advertising and branding is consistent with their function
as anti-lemon devices. Whether advertising and branding would render
drug regulation superfluous is difficult to ascertain because, historically,
the trend towards advertising and branding coincided with the growth of
drug regulation. Thus, while the ability to commit to quality through ad-
vertising and branding may support a claim that drug regulation is
superfluous, it may also be that by weeding out the dishonest sellers,
drug regulation supplements the signal created by advertising and brand-
ing and allows the more honest sellers to supply a clearer, and more
trustworthy, signal. If that is the case, without drug regulation, drug
companies would either have to invest even more in advertising and
branding, or might find it impossible to credibly commit to quality
through branding. Alternatively, it is also possible that while the signal-
ing effects of regulation and advertising are equivalent, government
certification provides a more direct and cost-effective signal.
packages is not easily established, the difficulty for customers or potential competitors to get
and verify information about the price and availability of services magnifies the dangers to
competition associated with misleading advertising." Id. at 772.
98. It has been debated whether reduced competition induces or inhibits innovation.
See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship, 120
Q.J. ECON. 701 (2005). I do not intend to solve this debate here. For the purposes of the point
made it is enough that, under some conditions, reduced competition inhibits innovation.
99. Currently, among OECD countries, only the United States and New Zealand permit
direct-to-consumer advertising of drugs. See Greg Finlayson & Ross Mullner, Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: Help or Hindrance to the Public's Health? 22 J.
CONSUMER MARKETING 429,429-31 (2005).
100. TEMIN, supra note 37, at 58-87.
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D. Reputation Economies of Scale
The informational effect of branding can expand if the firm applies
the same brand to more than one product. A portfolio of many products
associated with a single seller signals the quality of all of its products.
This may mitigate some of the deficiencies of branding, advertising, and
repeat sales described in the previous paragraphs. As the firm increases the
number of products for which it claims high quality, the probability of
consumers eventually detecting a false claim made by the firm increases as
well. As a result, the risk for the firm of damaging its brand's reputation
increases as well, and this reduces the firm's incentive to cheat in the first
place.' O' If credibly committing to quality requires a portfolio of drugs,
such portfolios may increase the barriers to entry to the industry, and result
in the same problems described in the previous section.
Historically, the drug industry has become increasingly more con-
centrated, and this trend is correlated to the increase in drug regulation.' 2
Whether large drug portfolios would suffice to prevent lemonization and
render regulation superfluous, or whether regulation supports the ability
of firms with smaller portfolios to remain competitive, is a difficult ques-
tion to answer.
E. Rivalry
Market rivalry may give competitors incentives to reveal information
about the quality of their rivals' products. If firm A provides inadequate
information about the quality of its drug, competitor firm B may inform
consumers that A's drug is not as efficacious and safe as advertised. B,
for that matter, may not necessarily be a competing drug company, but
may equally be a provider of a competing service whose sales decrease
when A's drug sales increase. For example, if the use of antidepressant
drugs reduces the demand for psychotherapy, practicing psychologists or
psychiatrists may seek to inform the public about the ineffectiveness or
dangers associated with antidepressants. 
03
However, the role of rivalry in assuring quality of drugs is limited.
First, firms may not have sufficient information about the quality of their
rivals' drugs, especially in an unregulated market, because there is no
requirement to produce such information.'O Second, even if they do have
101. See Thomas Liebi, Trusting Labels: A Matter of Numbers?, (Univ. of Bern Dep't of
Econ. Working Paper No. 0102, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=307080.
102. TEMIN, supra note 37, at 58-87.
103. See, e.g., FROM PLACEBO TO PANACEA: PUTTING PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS TO THE TEST
(Seymour Fisher & Roger P. Greenberg eds., 1997) (arguing that there is inadequate scientific
information to conclude that psychoactive drugs are substantially more effective than placebos).
104. Even under the existing regulation there is no requirement to disclose the data sub-
mitted to the FDA. The pharmaceutical industry has taken the position, which has been
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it, the problem inherent with credence goods is that consumers lack the
capacity to evaluate each of the competing sides' claim and may
discount both sides' claims altogether, unless they have good reason to
believe that some claims (for example, if supported by independent
scientific research) are more credible than others. If not, suggesting a
danger in A's drug may render the consumer suspicious of all drugs or
treatments of the same category, including B's. An FDA approval may
provide more credibility for B. Third, firm B may fail to find it beneficial
to disclose its knowledge that A's drug is ineffective or dangerous if B
can profit from selling an equally bad treatment until its futility is
ultimately discovered.' 5
F. Complementarity
A similar mechanism may develop if drugs complement other prod-
ucts or services. In such cases, the low quality of a drug may impose a
negative externality on the suppliers of the complement good, particu-
larly if the consumer cannot ascertain which component of the combined
treatment was harmful or ineffective. The supply of drugs and medical
care demonstrates such complementarity. Physicians clearly benefit
when they can provide their patients with high quality drugs (if the two
are complements rather than substitutes), and may face lower demand
for their services if only quack medicines are available.' °
Two observations follow. First, drug companies may not bear the full
cost of low-quality drugs and therefore may have a less-than-perfect in-
centive to supply high quality. Second, physicians may seek to minimize
this negative externality by demanding verifiable information about
drugs' quality claims. However, physicians are numerous and dispersed
and may not individually find it beneficial or possible to exert pressure
on drug companies, although several mechanisms and institutions allow
physicians to overcome this collective action problem. For example, as
early as 1905, the American Medical Association (AMA) decided to ban
advertisements of ineffective nostrums in its Journal of the American
Medical Association. The AMA established the Council on Pharmacy
and Chemistry to test the proprietary medicines and determine which, if
any, could substantiate their curative claims. The results would then be
supported by the FDA, that the data are trade secrets belonging to the submitting firm.
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 380.
105. See, e.g., Trudo Lemmens, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Secrecy about Clinical
Trials, 34 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 14, 15 (2004) ("Competitors will not challenge a company's
claim that anxiety, shyness, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and post-traumatic stress disor-
der are endemic and have to be aggressively treated with medication.").
106. The reverse is probably true as well: drug companies may benefit from high quality
medical profession.
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published in the Journal."° Publicly-funded research, carried out by phy-
sician-researchers may be another example of a mechanism that
alleviates this collective action problem. On the other hand, it will not
always be in physicians' and their organizations' best interest to disclose
negative information on drugs. In some cases, realizing that the dissemi-
nation of negative information would hurt the demand for their services,
physicians and other medical institutions may decide to conceal such
information.' °8
Another complication comes from yet another direction. Even when
exerting pressure on drug companies to supply high-quality drugs is in
the best interest of physicians, the collective action problem described
above implies that only collective pressure would be effective. Such col-
lective pressure would inevitably involve a risk of allegations of illegal
boycotting and potential antitrust liability. In Wilk v. AMA,' °9 for exam-
ple, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision that a rule promulgated by the AMA Committee on
Quackery, which made it unethical for physicians to professionally asso-
ciate with chiropractors, violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
court rejected the AMA's argument that the boycott was pro-competitive
because it was a response to a market failure caused by information
asymmetry. The AMA advanced a lemons story arguing that because the
market for medical services is one in which consumers lack sufficient
information to evaluate the quality of medical services, consumers would
avoid necessary treatment for fear of fraud and accept treatment with no
expectation of quality. According to the AMA, its conduct ensured that
107. Letter from the Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry, American Medical Associa-
tion, to the Manufacturing Pharmacists and Chemists of the United States and to Others
Concerned, 44 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 719 (1905). See also YOUNG, supra note 9, at 187-88. De-
pendency on advertising revenue, however, seems to have prevailed. In the early 1950s,
concerns about advertising revenues led the AMA to stop publishing lists of fraudulent and
useless drugs in its publications. See Trudo Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring
Scientific Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641, 646
n.60 (2004), (citing PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS,
AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 127 (2003)). Similarly, the New England Journal
of Medicine recently announced that it would not always enforce a rule requiring the disclo-
sure of authors' financial interests, as it has become increasingly difficult to find researchers
who do not have financial links with producers or competitors. Id. at 646.
108. See Lemmens, supra note 105 (explaining how various financial interests affect
research or the disclosure of its result by non-industry actors who otherwise would have an
interest in obtaining and disseminating such information). See also TEMIN, supra note 37, at
29 (noting that the AMA decision from 1905 to eliminate nostrum ads from JAMA was
dropped by the following year). Temin also reports that in 1929, the AMA reinstated such a
program (the "Seal of Acceptance" program), only to drop it in the mid-1950s. According to
Temin, the primary reason for the policy change was AMA's need for cash, which unrestricted
advertising could-and did-generate. Id. at 85-86.
109. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982
(1990).
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physicians acquired a reputation for quality, in part by not associating
with chiropractors, which the AMA regarded as "unscientific cultists.""
It also allowed consumers to be assured that physicians would use only
scientifically valid treatment. The court rejected the argument, noting
that while "[g]etting needed information to the market is a fine goal ...
the AMA was not motivated solely by such altruistic concerns ... [and]
intended to 'destroy a competitor,' namely, chiropractors.' The AMA
also failed to show that its measures to address concerns for patient care
could not be achieved "in a manner less restrictive of competition.""
'
1
2
While eliminating antitrust liability may enhance professional groups'
ability to self-regulate, such a move may not always be desirable. Be-
cause the group seeks to maximize its members' net gain, and extra
profits may be achieved at a lower level of total output, the quality stan-
dard chosen by professional groups may exceed the socially optimal
level." 3
G. Information Intermediaries
Because consumers cannot observe credence qualities even after
consumption, sellers and buyers can only partially rely on the above
mentioned mechanisms to signal quality. This is when quality assurances
supplied by third parties, who act as information intermediaries, may be
used. There are three types of information intermediation: advice, certi-
fication, and licensing.
1. Advice: Physicians and Pharmacists
Consumers can hire advisers whose training, talent, or investment of
time and effort in collecting information allows them to know more
about credence goods' quality. Physicians and pharmacists can fulfill this
function regarding drugs by acting as disinterested experts, or learned
informational intermediaries, to alleviate some of the problems that re-
110. Id. at 361.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 363.
113. Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1339 (1979). In the context of physicians and drugs, the
concern could be that physicians would adopt excessive quality standards to boycott safe and
effective drugs that could reduce the demand for their services. This is why the majority opin-
ion in California Dental Association, 526 U.S. 756, to the extent that it limits antitrust scrutiny
of self-regulation, is troublesome. As Professor Hovenkamp explains, the Court erred not in
finding that the market for dental services is prone to lemonization but in concluding that "the
dentists themselves were worthy policemen to protect [consumers]." Herbert Hovenkamp,
Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 22 (2004).
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suit from information asymmetry.' 4 Arguably, physicians who prescribe
drugs (as well as the pharmacists that fill the prescriptions) have access
to extensive information regarding the properties of the drugs. Physi-
cians also have extensive medical training and continually update this
information through medical literature and professional seminars that
can be drawn upon to brief the patient regarding the consequences of the
drug." A similar rationale stood behind the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, which introduced, among other things, the pre-
scription-only regulation, which assumed that consumers are not
competent to make informed decisions regarding drugs, and that physi-
cians should make the choice in their stead." 1
6
However, using advisers is an imperfect anti-lemon device. First,
they may have less-than-optimal incentives to invest in gathering infor-
mation because it is a public good." 7 Second, just as with the quality of
drugs, verifying the quality of the services rendered by information in-
termediaries is costly because such services are credence goods
themselves. This may explain why physicians and pharmacists are them-
selves subject to licensing requirements and ongoing regulation by
governments or by the professions' self-regulatory bodies, and why they
have developed norms that value trust relationships with patients and an
ethos of priority of the patient's welfare over the physician's profit-
maximization."8
Third, while physicians and pharmacists are better positioned than
their patients to evaluate drugs' quality claims, they cannot fill their pa-
tients' information gap until a drug has been utilized long enough to allow
gathering, processing, and communication of sufficient information about
its safety and efficacy. However, in the case of new drugs, a physician will
be only slightly better positioned than the consumer regarding efficacy
114. W. K. Viscusi, Efficacy of Labeling of Foods and Pharmaceuticals, 15 ANN. REV.
PUB. HEALTH 325, 327 (1994).
115. Id.
116. TEMIN, supra note 37, at 54. The prescription-only regulation presents another
interesting effect of drug regulation, which complements, rather than undermining the patent
system. As Temin explains, when a drug is sold only under prescription, the demand for the
drug becomes much less elastic because the prescribing doctor is insensitive to the price and
the patient (or the insurer) cannot purchase an alternative drug, even if she prefers to. As a
result, drug companies could charge much higher prices for their products. In most cases the
drug company decides whether to designate a drug as "prescription only," and drug companies
failed to oppose this aspect of regulation. Id. at 52-54.
117. GRABOWSKI & VERNON, supra note 27, at 67.
118. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
EcON. REV. 941. 966 (1963).
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and safety."9 The physician may be able to identify whether some claims
make sense, but she does not have any meaningful information about
side effects, interactions with other drugs, and efficacy of treatment until
they are tested. But even in the case of drugs already on the market, as-
sessing their quality is beyond the professional capability of any
individual physician or pharmacist. Not only is the concept of effective-
ness itself vague, however dramatic the effect of a drug on one person
may be, meaningful information on drugs' quality can be obtained only
by looking at large samples and carefully applying statistical methods.' 20
This type of research is beyond the ordinary skills of most practicing
physicians and pharmacists, and even if they had the skills, writing pre-
scriptions or dispensing drugs may not allow enough time for applying
them.' 2' Of course, physicians and pharmacists do not necessarily have to
conduct research on their own, and theoretically they can rely on re-
search done by others if such information exists and is made available to
them. However, practicing physicians are notoriously incapable of gath-
ering and processing enough information about new and existing drugs
and treatments, and as a result tend to exhibit strong habit persistence in
112their treatment decisions.
Similarly to their patients, physicians will average the claims regard-
ing new drugs in the absence of credible quality assurance. Regulatory
review, therefore, may provide the critical mass of credible evidence
necessary to persuade physicians to start or continue prescribing a drug.
Once they start prescribing the new drug, they could gather more infor-
mation and make it available to other physicians.123 Therefore, even in
the absence of mandatory regulation, given the risk aversion of many
physicians and their tendency to follow habit,' 24 drug companies that
seek to rely on them as intermediaries would have to conduct lengthy
119. See Avorn, supra note 64, at 72 (claiming that even with FDA approval, "when a
new drug is first marketed, little is known about its safety and efficacy compared to existing
alternatives, and the situation is often no clearer years or decades later.").
120. TEMIN, supra note 37, at 9-10.
121. Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 50, at 616 (discussing the danger of information
overload affecting physicians).
122. See generally Ramkumar Janakiranam et al., Physicians' Persistence and its Impli-
cations for their Response to Promotion of Prescription Drugs, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1016602 (reviewing the literature
on physicians' persistence and finding empirical support for its magnitude). See also Avorn,
supra note 64, at 270-71.
123. Physicians are allowed to prescribe and pharmacists are allowed to dispense drugs
for "off label" use, i.e., purposes other than those approved by the FDA, as long as the off-
label use was generally recognized as acceptable in the scientific community. The general
rules governing their professional liability would apply.
124. Janakiranam et al., supra note 122. See also Scherer, supra note 14, at 101.
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and costly trials to produce enough evidence to convince physicians to
prescribe new drugs.1
25
2. Certification
Similarly to advisers, trusted third parties may alleviate the market
failures that result from information asymmetry by certifying the quality
of credence goods. Unlike advisers, usually retained by the consumer,
the clients of the certifying entity are the sellers. Firms commonly use
voluntary third-party quality certificates to assure the quality of prod-
ucts, especially to signal the quality of their experience or credence
attributes. Examples are abundant. The International Organization for
Standardization's ISO 9000 is widely used to certify "quality manage-
ment," or in ISO's language, it aims to "fulfill[] the customer's quality
requirements, and applicable regulatory requirements, while aiming to
enhance customer satisfaction, and achieve continual improvement of its
performance in pursuit of these objectives.' 26 As consumers are increas-
ingly interested in the environmental impact of firms' production
processes, a credence property, ISO has begun issuing its ISO 14000,
primarily concerned with "environmental management.', 127 ISO 14000
certifies "what the organization does to[] minimize harmful effects on
the environment caused by its activities, and to achieve continual im-
provement of its environmental performance.', 128 The range of credence
quality certificates includes the ancient Kosher certification in Jewish
communities,2 9 environmental certificates, organic products, socially
conscious "Fair Trade" labels, 3° and the recently proposed "Fair Em-
ployment Mark" that companies can apply to their products and services
to indicate that they have promised not to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation. 131
125. Some may regard this prediction as nafve and may argue that instead of investing
more in scientifically establishing the quality of their drugs, drug manufacturers will invest in
bribing physicians through lavish promotional expenditures in the guise of "educational" ac-
tivities. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 15, at 141-43.
126. See International Organization for Standardization, ISO 9000 and ISO 14000,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso-Catalogue/management-standards/iso_9000_iso 14000.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Shayna M. Sigman, Kosher Without Law: The Role of Nonlegal Sanctions
in Overcoming Fraud Within the Kosher Food Industry, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 509 (2004)
(discussing the Kosher industry).
130. See Maria L. Loureiro & Justus Lotade, Do Fair Trade and Eco-Labels in Coffee
Wake Up the Consumer Conscience?, 53 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 129, 129-30 (2005) (describing
the origins and meaning of fair trade labels).
131. See IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: HOW TO MO-
BILIZE HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS 79-94 (2005).
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While certification may alleviate some concerns about quality, it suf-
fers from several drawbacks. First, certification itself is a credence good,
hence the eternal question remains: quis custodiet ipsos custodies?
13 2
Second, if with regard to a certain attribute more than one certifying
body exists, each employing different standards, the signals provided
may become blurred. Third, consumers may suspect a certifying body
that financially depends on its clients. Certifying bodies would therefore
need effective quality assurance mechanisms as well, which may not
work perfectly.
3. Licensing
In the case of licensing, a third party, such as the government, de-
termines which product or seller may enter the market. Unlike certifying,
which is voluntary, licensing is mandatory and requires the state's
involvement. 33 Licensing may assure quality by directly regulating the
product through output regulation, or indirectly, by setting minimum
requirements for firms in the industry through input regulation.3 4 Current
drug regulation is an example of the former. It requires a license to mar-
ket every drug. Occupational licensing, which is common in medical,
legal, and other professions is an example of the latter.35 It does not di-
rectly regulate the quality of the service but instead seeks to ensure "that
professionals engage in a minimum level of human capital invest-
ment.,, 36
It is by no means suggested here that licensing may not be suscepti-
ble to failures of its own. Asking quis custodiet ipsos custodies may be
appropriate to the licensing agency as well. The FDA, for example, has
been criticized for being inherently over-cautious because the institu-
tional incentives confronting its officials lead them to concentrate on
avoiding Type-I errors, approving drugs that are not safe and effective,
and ignoring Type-I errors, keeping off the market safe and effective
drugs. 33 Regulatory capture, which may lead to too lax regulation, is
132. Who shall guard the guardians?
133. An industry may also determine which products will be sold and by which sellers.
Such attempts, however, without endorsement by the government, may run afoul the antitrust
laws.
134. See Carl Shapiro, Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing, 53 REV.
ECON. STUD. 843, 844 (1986).
135. It is conceivable to imagine a different model of drug regulation under which the
FDA would set minimum testing and manufacturing standards to which all drug companies
would have to adhere and debar those companies with a negative track record.
136. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 844.
137. GRABOWSKI & VERNON, supra note 27, at 10 (explaining that FDA officials com-
mitting Type-II errors may bear heavy personal costs because the effects of such errors can be
highly visible and are one for which both the FDA and the official are held politically ac-
countable, whereas the effect of Type-I errors are much less visible and are borne largely by
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another concern. 38 Moreover, licensing may be an excessive solution to
the lemons problem. In the used cars example, the problem arises be-
cause sellers of good cars cannot differentiate themselves from sellers of
bad cars and cannot exact a price that will keep them in the market. But
while the quality of used cars varies, so too do the preferences and risk
tolerance of consumers. Even bad cars, if sold at a sufficient discount,
may be a bargain for some consumers. If a credible signal for each qual-
ity type can be communicated, so that buyers can choose from a menu of
different price/quality matches, total exclusion of bad cars makes no
sense. The same is true for drugs. The current licensing structure only
allows sales of new drugs which meet a certain threshold of efficacy and
safety. Yet even a banned drug can be the best available drug for some
consumers for several reasons. First, the FDA approves only new drugs
whose average therapeutic effect is higher than the average therapeutic
effect of a placebo, but merely because the drug's average effect fell be-
low the average for the entire sampled population does not mean that it
is ineffective to members of some non-identified sub-groups or individu-
als.'39 Second, different drug users may have different safety/efficacy
preferences. For example, a patient whose odds of remaining untreated
are even worse may be willing to take an effective but dangerous drug,
or may be rationally willing to spend money on long shots, even when he
knows that they are no more than long shots.
H. Ex post Liability
Legal liability may also supply direct and indirect incentives for
quality. Tort law may eliminate the marketing of harmful products and
the negligent provision of services. Contract law and consumer protec-
tion laws may hold sellers liable for false quality claims. Such laws,
which may be reinforced by criminal liability, directly decrease the sale
of low quality products by making their sale more costly. They also indi-
rectly promote quality by making it easier for sellers credibly to commit
to quality. Procedural instruments, such as class actions, may make the
outside parties (drug companies and sick patients)); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE:
How EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 116-18
(2006).
138. For the classic statement of capture, see George Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) (explaining that regulators sometimes
serve the interests of the regulated rather than the public interest).
139. EPSTEIN, supra note 137, at 120 (citing Anup Malani & Feifang Hu, The Option
Value of New Therapeutics 1 (October 25, 2004) (unpublished manuscript)). The new science
of "pharmacogenomics" might remedy this problem by connecting variations in drug receptiv-
ity to differences in recipients' DNA sequences, thus optimizing drug therapy to ensure
maximum efficacy with minimal adverse effects, and making clinical trials more precise and
possibly less costly. See Scherer, supra note 84, at 11-12.
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former more effective by aggregating small claims that otherwise would
be too costly to litigate and by overcoming problems of collective action
among many victims. Regulatory agencies, even if not engaged in licens-
ing or certification, may enhance adherence to higher quality by using
their coercive powers to obtain information, by exploiting increasing
returns to scales to gather information on products' less observable quali-
ties, and by bringing lawsuits against sellers making false claims or
selling products of a quality below prescribed standards.
However, relying on ex post liability to assure effective ex ante in-
centives to supply quality drugs depends on the ability of a court to
verify ex post that quality claims were false or that the drugs were harm-
ful. But in the case of credence goods, whose quality is inherently
difficult to ascertain, even in retrospect, courts may only suboptimally
impose liability, potentially leading to under- or over-deterrence.'4° Theo-
retically, under-deterrence may be corrected by increasing the penalty,
criminal or civil, but this may provide only partial solutions and may
141create its own distortions. Paradoxically, increased liability may even
lead drug companies to keep bad products on the market and avoid gath-
ering information about the effects of their products, or doing anything
else that might signal bad quality. A drug company may fear that the
public would view such actions as a "confession" that the drug is harm-
ful and invite an eruption of lawsuits which, given the information
asymmetry, would otherwise be unlikely. 42 Over-deterrence may occur
when courts or juries are overly sympathetic to plaintiffs' claims, espe-
cially when an individual plaintiff person sues a deep-pocket
pharmaceutical corporation. Over-deterrence may be just as serious a
social problem as under-deterrence. Both would reduce the number of
available quality drugs. From the point of view of solving the lemons
problem, however, the respective effects are not symmetric. Under-
deterrence may cause lemonization, whereas over-deterrence may solve
it, although perhaps excessively.
These two possible distortions suggest that relying solely on ex post
litigation initiated by individuals would not be the best way to deal with
such complex issues, and that some form of regulatory oversight by an
administrative agency may be desirable. As even Richard Epstein-not
140. Leland, supra note 113, at 1330 (noting that making sellers liable for poor quality
products or services may only be useful when product failure is readily observable ex post,
whereas "it may be difficult or impossible to ascertain product failure in cases where the effect
is long, delayed and partial").
141. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(2004).
142. Omri Ben-Shahar, The (Legal) Pains of Vioxx: Why Product Liability Can Make
Products More Dangerous, 3 THE ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1, 2-3 (June 2006), available at http://
www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss6/art6.
Pharmaceutical Lemons
known for his fondness of centralized government control-has noted:
"Administrative review has the unfortunate feature of centralized control,
which is difficult to correct. But whereas the tort system privileges ex-
treme outcomes, the administrative system, suitably capped, is less likely
to run off the rails.' 43
V. PUBLIC VS. SELF-REGULATION
I noted earlier that many suppliers of credence goods, other than
pharmaceuticals, find it in their best interest to signal quality by using
third-party certifiers. This suggests two things. First, that signaling
achieved by other market mechanisms such as repeat purchasers, warran-
ties, and advertising may fail to solve fully the problem of information
asymmetry in such industries. Second, that government regulation may
function as a substitute for similar forms of third-party certification that
drug companies would otherwise have to set up. The cost and delay as-
sociated with such certification may simply represent the inherent costs
of selling credence goods. Therefore, the view that regulation is in fact a
valuable service may replace the notion that new-drug regulation is a
burden imposed on the industry. Yet merely recognizing that regulation
by the government may substitute for forms of self-regulation fails to tell
us which type of regulation is preferable. It only tells us that it is plausi-
ble that government regulation would be preferable. Answering this
question requires comparing the relative costs and benefits of each
method.
One immediate benefit that the industry may derive from public
regulation would be the erection of barriers to entry and other benefits
associated with regulatory capture.'" This benefit to the industry coun-
sels against such forms of regulation, unless such benefits to the industry
translate into a higher expected return on its R&D, thus complementing
the patent system in another manner. I raise this potential negative regula-
tory effect but will now set it aside, not because it is unimportant, but
because I would like to focus on the under-researched way in which pub-
licly-supplied drug regulation benefits the industry in a way that is aligned
with the public interest. The focus is on the ability of drug regulation and
143. EPSTEIN, supra note 137, at 236.
144. See Stigler, supra note 138. Cf Daniel Carpenter, Protection Without Capture:
Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator, 98 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
613, 626-27 (2004) (considering capture theory as it relates to the FDA and arguing that while
capture may exist, it does not necessarily fully explain evidence of barriers to entry and large
firm advantage in regulated markets).
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approval to remedy information asymmetry and save the drug markets
from the fate of lemonization.
A. Some Advantages of Public Regulation
Despite its well-documented shortcomings, public regulation may
present several advantageous features not easily available to self-
regulators. First, public regulation may be doing a better job in aligning
the various interests of the public, the industry, and individuals such as
managers. Avoiding the failures that result from information gaps is in
the interest of both industry and consumers, yet assuring quality is a
public good. Once a quality assurance mechanism has been set up, each
firm faces an incentive to cheat and free-ride on the reputation of the
industry. Similarly, managers may face an incentive to cheat in order to
gain short-term profits and a short-term increase in the firm's valuation
without internalizing the longer term damage to the reputation of the
firm and the industry.
Under either type of regulation some firms may seek to free-ride on
the reputation of the regulated firms. They may do so by failing to opt
into the regulatory scheme either entirely or selectively. For example,
they may not submit any drug for certification or submit some, but not
all. Other forms of cheating may include obtaining approval by submit-
ting false or incomplete information, concealing negative information
after approval was granted, continuing to market a drug even if it be-
comes known ex post that the approval should not have been granted, or
bribing the certifying entity or its officials. But while the incentives to
cheat exist under either type of regulation, self-regulation schemes may
be less effective in preventing it. For example, self-regulators would not
generally have the ability to exclude such drugs from the market. Of
course, they may seek to mitigate these problems by incorporating ap-
propriate elaborate terms in the relevant governing contracts, or by
boycotting defiant members or third parties. However, executing such
provisions and boycotts may be highly ineffective or extremely costly,
and could also involve the entities in antitrust145 and other legal difficul-
ties.' 46 In addition, how effective certification schemes are depends on
how well consumers can distinguish between certified and non-certified
drugs and recognize the differences between the certified and the non-
certified, or between different variants of certification.
145. See supra Part IV.F.
146. For example, the tort of wrongful interference with an economic relationship. See
generally Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, 2 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 10:28 (4th ed. 2007).
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In contrast, by harnessing state power, licensing through a public
regulatory scheme may do a better job in preventing these kinds of
cheating. First, as opposed to voluntary licensing or voluntary certifica-
tion, a regime of mandatory licensing that applies to all drugs prevents
free-riding by opting out as described above. Second, to discourage
cheating by falsifying information, the FDA may demand information,
inspect and enter manufacturers' facilities, 47 withdraw marketing ap-
proval if approval was granted based on bribery, fraud, or similar act, or
if the drug maker "repeatedly demonstrated a lack of ability to produce
the drug for which the application was submitted in accordance with the
formulations or manufacturing practice set forth in the abbreviated drug
application and has introduced, or attempted to introduce, such adulter-
ated or misbranded drug into commerce."'
14
In addition, penalties ranging from civil sanctions to criminal fines
and imprisonment, as well as excluding non-compliant individuals or
firms from the market, may assist in reducing the incentives to cheat in a
manner that would not be at the disposal of private certifiers. Even if
self-regulators could effectively prevent cheating, the inherent potential
for anti-competitive abuse may make self-regulation less attractive than
it otherwise would seem.141
Moreover, if an important benefit of regulation is not only excluding
dangerous or ineffective drugs from the market, but also providing qual-
ity assurance to consumers with regard to the drugs that are marketed,
then public regulation may possess advantages over self-regulation if
consumers trust a public regulatory agency more than they would a pri-
vate entity, particularly one that is funded by or financially dependent on
drug producers.'50 Indeed, the FDA ranks high in public trust. In a 2000
survey by the Pew Research Center and Princeton Survey Research As-
sociates, the FDA received an overall favorable rating of over eighty
percent, more than twice the approval rate of the entire government and
higher than other federal agencies studied.'-' While public trust in the
147. 21 U.S.C. § 374 (2004).
148. Id. § 335(c)(a).
149. See supra Part IV.F. Of course, public regulation is not immune to successful at-
tempts by the regulated industry to obtain regulation that advances its anti-competitive agenda.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT.
Sci. 335 (1974).
150. TIROLE, supra note 59, at 110 n.19; Peltzman, supra note 31, at 1052 n.1.
151. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Performance and Purpose; Con-
stituents Rate Government Agencies (April 12, 2000), http://people-press.org/reports/display.
php3?ReportlD=41. Spam e-mails provide more anecdotal evidence for consumers' valuation
of the regulatory process. Attempting to sell fake medicines, many spammers falsely state that
those drugs are "FDA APPROVED," thus indicating their belief in the promotional power of
such FDA designation. Accordingly, spain filters often include the term "FDA APPROVED"
in their lists of suspicious terms. Examples of such span e-mails are on file with the author.
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FDA has deteriorated recently, trust in the pharmaceutical industry has
declined even further.
52
As mentioned earlier, the FDA is inherently over-cautious, focusing
on avoiding Type-I errors (approving drugs that are not safe and effec-
tive) and ignoring Type-fl errors (rejecting safe and effective drugs). 53
Notwithstanding the social costs arising from this tendency, one benefit
accruing to the manufacturers of those drugs that are approved is a
stronger signal about their quality. If consumers recognize the FDA's
tendency to be overcautious, their confidence in the quality of approved
drugs increases.
B. Regulation's Real Effects vs. Placebo Effects
In the previous sections I have suggested why regulation of new
drugs may function as an anti-lemon device and why it may do a better
job in assuring new drugs' quality compared to market-based devices.
Whether the FDA or equivalent regulators in other countries actually
function better than the market, requires additional studies beyond the
scope of this Article. However, in evaluating the impact of drug regula-
tion on social welfare, such studies should consider not only the
objective effects of the regulation, but also their "placebo effects," or the
way regulation manipulates the subjective beliefs of consumers and
other market participants about the effect of regulation. 4 The important
fact here is not whether, objectively, the FDA does a better job than pri-
vate market-based institutions in distinguishing between high- and low-
quality drugs. What is important are consumers' subjective beliefs about
the trustworthiness of such institutions. If consumers trust the FDA more
than they would trust a self-regulatory body, they will discount the qual-
ity assurance of the private entity and would be willing to pay less for
such drugs even if objectively the private entity would do a better job. If
this is the case, public regulation would be preferable over self-
regulation from both the consumers' and the drug companies' points of
view.
Commentators have often pointed out that the main reforms in drug
regulation followed widely publicized scandals, the Elixir Sulfanilamide
scandal in 1937, and the Thalidomide scandal in 1961.'"' Some have re-
152. Carpenter, supra note 51, at W5-470.
153. GRABOWSKI & VERNON, supra note 27, at 10; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 137, at
116-18.
154. See generally Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law's Role in Manipulat-
ing Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 54 (2006).
155. See, e.g., Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in THE POLITICS OF REGU-
LATION 191, 196, 199 (James Q. Wilson ed. 1980); GRABOWSKI & VERNON, supra note 27, at
2-3.
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marked that the actual reforms adopted covered much broader ground
than was necessary to prevent these incidents.5 6 However, the argument
may actually indicate a placebo effect of drug regulation. Both the Elixir
Sulfanilamide and Thalidomide incidents were highly publicized and
involved highly visible tragedies, including 107 deaths of mostly chil-
dren in the case of Elixir Sulfanilamide, and birth defects in the case of
Thalidomide. These may have caused the exact three forms of cognitive
biases which, according to Aviram may cause the public to overestimate
risks: availability bias, vividness bias, and social amplification.' 7 Thus,
the reforms might have overreacted when considering the objective risk
of new drugs, but that overreaction might have been necessary to de-bias
the public's perception of the risk."8
VI. FINAL NOTE
So far, the possibility that drug regulation prevents the lemonization
of the pharmaceutical industry and benefits drug innovation has been
largely ignored by the scholarly literature on the industry, which was pre-
dominantly influenced by Peltzman's early 1970s studies. However, one of
the few who did think about this possibility was Peltzman himself.'59 In a
footnote he raised the possibility that the 1962 Amendments provided a
"public good" for the drug industry, in the form of independent evaluation
156. See, e.g., TEMIN, supra note 37, at 43 (tangentially-related legislation being enacted
after the elixir sulfanilamide tragedy); id. at 123-26 (arguing that the bill for the 1962
Amendments then pending in the Senate would have done little to prevent the thalidomide
tragedy and actually reflected the FDA's concerns, not the public's).
157. Aviram, supra note 154, at 71-75. The availability bias causes people to "assess the
frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occur-
rence [sic] can be brought to mind." Id. at 71 (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty-Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1127 (1974)). The viv-
idness bias "causes individuals to place more weight on concrete, emotionally interesting
information than on more probative abstract data." Id. at 73 (quoting Harry S. Gerla, The
"Reasonableness" Standard in the Law of Negligence: Can Abstract Values Receive Their
Due?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 199, 210 (1990)). Additionally,
Social amplification is a heuristic by which an individual relies on others' beliefs
when the individual has little independent knowledge of the matter. This reliance
causes people to perceive as more probable those risks that also concern others. As
a result, highly visible, dramatic events that capture media attention generate im-
mense public concern that is disproportionate to the actual risk.
Id. at 74-75.
158. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the literature has recognized the public's and the phy-
sicians' reluctance to consume and prescribe new drugs following the thalidomide incident as
a cause for the decline in new drug introductions. It appears that even the 1962 Amendments
were not fully or immediately effective in de-biasing the perception of risk.
159. See also Law, supra note 9; Carpenter, supra note 51.
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and certifications, but was quick to dismiss the argument by noting that
if "private underproduction of new drug evaluations is corrected by the
Amendments, the demand price of new drugs would be increased more
than the costs of complying with the amendments, and new-drug output
would rise." '60 But because he observed a marked decline in new drug
output, which he attributed to the Amendments, he quickly rejected the
hypothesis. 161
Yet a broader historical perspective on the pharmaceutical industry
may give greater credence to the beneficial effects of drug regulation.
When one examines nineteenth-century drug markets, as described in the
introduction, one observes the quintessential example of a lemons mar-
ket. Historically, the pharmaceutical industry's transformation from its
lemon state to its current highly scientific nature coincided with the in-
troduction and expansion of drug regulation. Moreover, the decline in
NCEs introduced during the 1960s and 1970s, which engendered the
antinomy between regulation and innovation, has changed its course
since the 1980s. During the 1980s, the number of approvals per year in-
creased 35% to 18.5. In the 1990s, the approvals grew an additional 48%
to 27.4.162 The turnaround in NCEs since the 1980s has been explained
by adaptation of drug companies to the new regulatory regime, 163 as well
as new discovery opportunities from breakthroughs in biochemistry, en-
zymology, molecular biology,'64 and genetic engineering. 16 More
recently there has again been a downturn. 166 Overall, the average number
of approved NCEs per year in the 1970-2005 period was 21.4 "with a
statistically significant upward trend . 67
Prudence counsels against immediately concluding from this obser-
vation that the transformation of the pharmaceutical industry's dismal
state in the nineteenth century to its current nature is attributable to the
anti-lemon role of drug regulation. Clearly, other factors determining the
quality of drugs did not remain constant. Many institutions such as con-
tract law, tort law, consumer protection laws, and class actions, necessary
to support market-based lemon devices, such as those described above,
160. Peltzman, supra note 31, at 1052 n.1.
161. Id. at 1052. Peltzman's quick dismissal of the hypothesis may also be explained by
the fact that at the time he wrote his paper, economic analysis of markets with information
asymmetries was a newly emerging field of economic research. Akerlof's lemons paper was
published in 1970 and Peltzman's in 1973.
162. Dimasi, supra note 38, at 1172.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Scherer, supra note 14, at 100.
166. Scherer, supra note 38, at 927.
167. Scherer, supra note 84, at 3 (excluding 1995 and 1996 from the average due to an
unusually high upward trend).
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have developed as well. And above all, the scientific basis for medical
care and pharmaceutical development and production has grown pro-
foundly since the days Mrs. Carlill purchased her carbolic smoke ball
and contracted the flu. Arguably, life sciences and pharmacology would
have advanced regardless of drug regulation, and as Peltzman argues, the
"natural progress of opulence"'68 could mask the negative effects of regu-
lation and allows it to survive politically because "[miedical progress of
all kinds continues. Beneficial new drugs, however delayed, ultimately
do make it to market."'' 69 Yet, assuming that science advances "naturally"
seems a bit naive. "Academic science is transformed into [beneficial new
drugs] through richly interconnected networks. '"'7 Commercial prospects
drive at least some scientific endeavors, whether such research occurs
within the laboratories of drug companies, with their financial support,
or even in publicly funded research institutions. If we observe tremen-
dous medical progress, it is likely that the present institutions are
conducive to such progress. Of course, observation tells us nothing about
the effect of any particular institution, only that their aggregate effect is
conducive to medical progress. Therefore, Peltzman's point that without
regulation progress would be even greater is, while non-falsifiable, still
entirely plausible. However, I believe that the Akerlovian insights sug-
gested in this Article, combined with a broader historical perspective on
the development of the industry, allow us to give more credit to the bene-
ficial aspects of drug regulation than that given by most economists who
have studied the area. At least, these insights allow us to acknowledge
the complexity of the issues.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current literature predominantly treats the regulation of drugs as a
drag on innovation: while patents are expected to encourage investment
in research and development of new drugs, the cost and delay caused by
new drug regulation reduces the expected return on such investment and
thereby reduces the incentive to innovate. On the basis of this argument,
drug companies have successfully lobbied legislators in the United
States, Japan, the European Union, and other countries for laws permit-
ting the extension of patent terms. This Article has shown that new drug
regulation may serve as an anti-lemon device, thus providing a valuable
service for the industry and consumers alike. Counter to common wis-
dom, regulation in fact may supplement the role of patents in
168. Peltzman, supra note 17, at 16.
169. Id.
170. Scherer, supra note 84, at 15.
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encouraging innovation. Whether this anti-lemon role outweighs the cost
and delay caused by regulation requires further study. Therefore, while
this Article may be understood as a defense of drug regulation, at most it
is only a defense of the general idea of drug regulation, not of any spe-
cific form thereof. Nor does this Article deny that many critics of the
current system, even if they ignored its anti-lemonization role, have still
identified some serious flaws in its operation. The simple point made is
that any cost-benefit evaluation of the current system and any proposal to
reform it may be incomplete without considering this under-studied role
of the regulatory framework.
Similarly, the insights of this Article do not necessarily imply that
laws permitting patent term extensions have been wrongly enacted. It is
still possible that effective patent life of twelve years leads to suboptimal
level of investment in innovating despite the positive effect of regulation.
In other words, even if in an unregulated world, in which the effective
patent life lasted the entire patent term, the flow of innovative drugs
would have been lower compared to the present world, this would not
tell us anything about how far from optimal the current patent system is.
It is still possible that current patent terms are suboptimally short. In the
same vein, even if increasing consumers' confidence in regulation in-
creases the rewards from innovation for successful drugs, it is
theoretically possible that because only fewer drugs are allowed to enter
the market, the total reward available for developers of new drugs is
smaller, and over-rewarding the successful ones (so as to achieve a nor-
mal rate of return over the entire portfolio of costly research) corrects the
ex ante incentives to innovate. 7' However, the decision whether to ex-
tend current patent terms or not should depend on correctly assessing all
the relevant factors, including the possibility that drug regulation posi-
tively affects the incentive to innovate. However, the justification for
patent term extension has relied thus far on the perceived dichotomy be-
tween the effects of patents and those of regulation. This dichotomy has
created the fairness argument: "you, the Government, give us patents
with one hand but then reduce their effective life through lengthy regula-
tion," and as such touches upon entrenched notions of equality ("if
inventors in other industries can enjoy a full twenty years of effective
patent life, why should the pharmaceutical industry be singled out and
have de facto shorter patents?"). The use of the terms "restoration" in the
American legislation and "penalize" in European legislation represent
this fairness approach.
Using this fairness argument makes strategic sense as a matter of ad-
vocacy. Relying only on economic data and arguments to convince
171. I thank Bruce Chapman for this point.
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legislators and voters that current patent terms are too short may be a
losing strategy. Not only do such arguments tend to be complex and bor-
ing (at least for many), they would often be countered by other studies.
The fairness argument is significantly less assailable. Strategically, then,
the patent/regulation dichotomy and the resulting fairness argument may
prove to be much more powerful tools. But this is unfortunate. If drug
regulation actually complements the patent system, the fairness argu-
ment should be taken off the table. Policy decisions about patent terms
should be made on the basis of economic data and theory. However
"treacherous ... the path to an optimal patent policy" may be,' if pat-
ents are granted to stimulate R&D, their terms should be determined on
the basis of their effect on R&D.
The insights of this Article may also be relevant in assessing propos-
als to relax or tighten the regulatory process. Under the patent/regulation
dichotomy, relaxing the regulatory process should have the same effect
as extending patent terms as both can increase the effective patent lif& or
otherwise increase the reward derived from the patent. In the short-run,
both options can increase the introduction of NCEs. But in the long-run,
relaxing the regulatory process can have a devastating effect on the in-
dustry if doing so would lead to its lemonization. But as long as the
patent/regulation dichotomy dominates the discourse, lobbying for such
relaxation could be fully rational. It may increase the market value of
existing firms and the compensation for current managers, but if that
would lemonize the industry sometime in the future, it would then be
someone else's problem. Again, nothing said here implies that the cur-
rent regulatory framework is optimal; only that ignoring its anti-lemon
role may be counterproductive.
172. EPSTEIN, supra note 137, at 61.
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